Harriet E. Rippentrop v. Minnie G. Pickering : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1963
Harriet E. Rippentrop v. Minnie G. Pickering : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Edward F. Richards; Gustin, Richards & Mattson; Attorneys for Respondent;
Miltn A. Oman; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation




IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRIElT E. RIPPENTROP, F I L E D 
~laintiff wnd Appellant, AUG l 5 1~63 
vs. Case No. 9896 
·" 
MINNIE G. PICKERING, 
Defe'I'IAdami and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPOND·EN'T 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, J UJdg'e 
, MILTON A. OMAN 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
M.NT1T88'0N 
1007 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Att0:rney~ for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IND·EX 
Page 
ST·ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE________________________________ 1 
DI,SPOSI'TION IN LOWER COURT____________________________________________ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL________________________________________________ 2 
STATEMENT OF F A:CTS____________________________________________________________ 2 
ARGUMEN'T ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
POINTS-
I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT AN 
OPEN, ADVERSE AND HOSTILE USE OF THE 
DRIVEWAY FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY 
YEARS OR MORE. -------------------------------------------------------- 8 
II. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BIE DIS-
MISSED BECAUSE AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT.-------------- 13 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
CASES CITED 
Buckley v. Cox (1952), 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277 ________________ 12 
Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., (5 Cir. 1946), 157 F. 
2d 216 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Gramatan-Sullivan, Inc. v. Koslow (2 Cir. 1957), 240 F.2d 
523 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Keegan v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., (5 Cir. 1946), 155 
F.2d 971 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Lumbermen's Mutua1 Casualty Company v. Egbert, 348 U.S. 
48, 99 L.ed. 59, 75 S. Ct. 15L----------------------------------------------- 13 
Lunt et al. v. Kitchens et al. (1953), 123 Utah 488, 260 
P.2d 535 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
Savage v. Nielsen (1948), 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 ____________ 10 
Zollinger v. Frank (1946), 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 __________ 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRIET E. RIPPE.N,TROP, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
MINNIE G. PICKERING, 
Defendam,t .and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPOND·ENT 
Oase No. 
9896 
The parties will be referred to as in the case below. 
ST.A:TEMENT OF THE KIND OF C.AJSE 
Plaintiff seeks to establish a right of way over de-
fendant's property claiming .an adverse user for a period 
of more than twenty years (Pretrial Order, R. 14). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the close of plaintiff's case defendant moved 
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for a dismissal (R. 86-87). The motion was provisionally 
denied (R. 88). At the close of all of the evidence both 
plaintiff .and defendant moved for a directed verdict. 
The court thereupon granted defendant's original motion 
of dismissal and discharged the jury (R. 132). Findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal 
were thereafter duly made .and entered (R. 17-21). 
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
Defendant, the respondent, defends the action of 
the court below, which appellant, the plaintiff, seeks to 
reverse. 
Appellant's statement of facts does not present the 
true setting of the case and in certain instances, herein-
after to be pointed out, is in direct conflict with the pro-
ceedings in the court below. We are impelled to restate 
the position of the parties. 
Mrs. Rippentrop is purchasing from Keren Skid-
more Wilde under a uniform real estate contract dated 
October 6, 1959 (Ex. 15 P) property located at 241 South 
Ninth East Street in Salt Lake City, described .as follows: 
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 4, 
Block 43, Plat "B", Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence South 261,4 feet; thence East 71!2 
rods; thence North 261,4 feet; thence West 7¥2 
rods to the place of beginning. 
Mrs. Pickering and Irene B. Schlegel are joint ten-
ants in the ownership of the property immediately to 
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the South at what is commonly known as 251 South Ninth 
East Street, Salt Lake City, and particularly described 
as follows: 
Beginning at a point 26.25 feet South from the 
Northwest corner of Lot 4, Block 43, Plat "B", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thewce South 
41.25 feet; thence East 123. 75· feet; thence North 
41.25 feet; thence West 123.75 feet to the point 
of beginning. (Entry 34, Abstract of title, Ex. 
16D'). 
Samuel R. Skidmore was the common owner, having 
acquired the larger tract by deed recorded June 6, 1882 
(Entry 3, Abstract of Title, Ex. 3 P). The North 25 
feet were conveyed by Samuel R. Skidmore to S. Ran-
dolph Skidmore by deed recorded June 24, 1892 (Entry 
5, Abstract of Title, Er. 3 P), the description of the 
property being as follows : 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 4 Block 
43 Plat "B" Salt Lake City Survey, thence East 
TY2 rods, thence South 25 feet, thence West 7¥2 
rods, thence North 25 feet to the place of begin-
ning. 
Samuel R. Skidmore conveyed the South 411~ feet, 
the property now owned by Minnie G. Pickering and 
Irene P. S.chlegel, to Mrs. May Pickering by deed dated 
September 23, 1909 (Entry 8, Abstract of Title, Ex. 16 
D). On the same day, September 23, 1909, Samuel R. 
Skidmore conveyed the strip of land 114 feet in width 
between the two properties as above described to S. 
Randolph Skidmore by warranty deed (Entry 17, Ab-
stract of Title, Ex. 3 P), thus accounting for the frontage 
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of 261_4 feet on the Rippentrop side of the title and mak-
ing that property immediately adjacent and contiguous 
to the North line of the Pickering property which other-
wise would have been separated by a strip of land 114 
feet in width. The description reads: 
Be:gi11fflling at a point 25 feet South of the North-
west corner of Lot 4, Block 43, Plat "B", Salt 
Lake City Survey, running thence South 11;4, feet; 
thence East 71h rods; thence North 114 feet; 
thence West 71j2 rods to the place of beginning. 
Exhibit 17 D shows the eaves of the Rippentrop 
residence to extend out approximately 11,4 feet on the 
South side next to the Pickering property. The deed 
conveying the 114 feet strip takes care of the encroach-
ment of the eaves over the property conveyed to Mrs. 
May PiGkering on the same day. The home now owned 
by Minnie G. Pickering and Irene P. Schlegel was con-
structed in 1913 (R. 34). The home now claimed by 
Mrs. Rippentrop was constructed before 1893 (R. 33). 
Mrs. May Pickering, the first wife of Alexander 
Pickering, was a daughter of her grantor, Samuel R. 
Skidmore. Mrs. Wilde was born in the home of her 
father, S. Randolph Skidmore in 1893 (R. 33) and re-
sided in the family home at 241 South Ninth East until 
September of 1924 (R. 62), but her parents, Mr. and Mrs. 
S. Randolph 8kidmore continued to reside there until 
1946 (R. 37). In the meantime May Skidmore was oc-
cupying the house next door with her husband Alexander 
Pickering and she remained there at least through 1925 
(R. 63). 
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The abstract of title covering the Rippentrop prop-
erty (Ex. 3 P) discloses that Samuel Randloph S!kid-
more, also :lrnown asS. Randolph Skidmore, remained the 
owner of the so-called Rippentrop property until his 
death on October 19, 1956. The decree of distribution 
dated June 12, 1957, and recorded the next day, distri-
butes the property in undivided interests to Leslie R. 
Skidmore, son, and Keren Skidmore Wilde, daughter 
(Entry 25-28, Abstract of Title, Ex. 3 P). On June 18, 
1957, Leslie R. Skidmore conveyed the property to his 
sister, Keren Skidmore Wilde, who remains the owner 
of the property subject to the uniform real estate con-
tract in favor of Mrs. Rippentrop (Entry 29, Abstract 
of Title, Ex. 3 P). 
The decree of distribution in the estate of S. Ran-
dolph Skidmore, in distributing the property now being 
purchased by Mrs. Rippentrop, makes no refe·rence to 
the ·alleyway which, as shown by the surveyor's plat Ex-
hibit 17 D, is wholly on the Pickering and Schlegel prop-
erty with a distance of 1.5 feet between the brick house 
claimed by Mrs. Rippentrop and the North line of the 
Pickering et al. property. On the West there is a dis-
tance of a fraction of a foot (0.1) and on the East an-
other fraction of a foot (0.4) between defendant's prop-
erty and the overhanging eaves on the Rippentrop home. 
The driveway is approximately 10 feet 4 inches in width 
between the two houses (R. 72) which leaves defendant 
with .approximately 31 feet out of the total frontage of 
4114 feet for her home and side yard on the South. 
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The expression in appellant's brief in the last para-
graph on page 6 to the effect that the father (Samuel R. 
Skidmore) deeded an extra strip to his son to extend 
"to the center of this drivew.ay" is a misstatement of fact. 
The Senior Skidmore gave the son Randolph two deeds. 
The first calls for a frontage on Ninth East of 25 feet 
commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 4. The sec-
ond one on the same date as the de·ed to the daughter, 
Mrs. May Pickering, calls for a front.age of 114 feet 
on Ninth East beginning at a point 25 feet South of the 
N orthwe~st corner of Lot 4. This same type of confusion 
permeates appellant's statement of facts. 
The statement in the last p:aragraph on page 7 of 
appellant's brief to the effect that there was an accepted 
property line North of appellant's property 261,4 feet 
"North of the center of the driveway" and that the "cen-
ter line of the driveway w.as likewise accepted and ac-
quiesced in as the property line between appellant's and 
defendant's properties until respondent built the fence 
last fall" is equally reprehensible. The record shows that 
the offe·r and any testimony on such a theory was ex-
pressly rejected by the tri.al court (R. 45-54). 
The defendant, Minnie G. Pickering, is the second 
wife of Alexander Pickering, whose first wife was May 
Skidmore (Entry 12-13, Abstract of Title, Ex. 16 D and 
R. 49). The relationship between the Skidmores was a 
friendly one (R. 64) and the friendly relationship appar-
ently continued between the parties in the inst.ant action 
until one of Mrs. Rippentrop's tenants received a letter 
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warning thein against using the driveway (R. 105 ). Two 
girls, tenants of ~Irs. Rippentrop, precipitated the feel-
ing between plaintiff and defendant in recent years (R. 
98-99, 102-103). 
'Vhen plaintiff's case in chief was concluded there 
was no evidence before the court to indicate where the 
driveway was with respect to the theoretical description 
of the properties claimed by the respective parties. 
Counsel for appellant indicated the contention that 
plaintiff was entitled to recover "regardless of whether 
it is located on our property or on the property of Mrs. 
Pickering" (R. 106-108). 
At the close of all of the testimony the trial court 
made the following observation: 
The case originally started out, according to 
the blueprint given this Court, or this division of 
the Court by the pretrial order, as an action only 
to establish a right-of-way. The facts show that 
originally all of the land was owned by Mrs. 
Wilde's grandfather, Samuel R. Skidmore. From 
Exhibit 2-P, which shows the Rippentrop home, 
I will conclude that, at that time, the son used 
his father's land. If this is a driveway to the 
south of the house, there certainly was no hostil-
ity between father and son for the use of the 
father's land. Mrs. Wilde's testimony shows a 
friendly relationship; the former Mrs. Pickering 
was her Aunt Mae. They visited betwe·en families. 
She came frequently, she said. The title to the 
Rippentrop home remained in Mrs. Wilde's father 
until1957, when title passed to Mrs. Wilde and her 
brothers by a decree of this Court. Up to the 
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time of the close of plaintiff's case there was no 
showing whatever of title to the ground in either 
of these properties. In order to establish a right-
of-way, a person must admit that the title to the 
ground is in somebody else because he need not 
make a claim of easement over his own ground. 
He has all the elements of ownership in his own 
ground. Accordingly, there was nothing before 
this Court at the close orf plaintiff's case to make a 
determination of easement. 
Now, in this case, it seems that plaintiff is beyond 
the pleadings, beyond the pretrial order, particu-
larly, asking the Court, not only to determine the 
boundary line by acquiescence, but to create an en-
tirely new estate-a tenancy in common-between 
these parties on an area between the houses, un-
defined as to width or as to length, and to estab-
lish as a tenancy-in-common such an area. This 
Court thinks that even with the many patches 
on Joseph's coat, that we should not put-attempt 
to put a patch on as is asked in this case, of estab-
lishing a new property interest, a tenancy-in-com-
mon of an undefined area, by width or length, and 
set it up as owned by the· present owners of the 
Pickering and Rippentrop properties. (R. 130-
132). 
Defendant in her motion for a directed verdict 
asserted that there was no evidence of adverse use for 
a period of twenty years or more and that Mrs. Picker-




THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO :SHOW THAT AN OPEN, 
.A:DVERSE AND HOSTILE US:E OF THE DRIVEWAY FOR 
A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS OR MORE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
There must be evidence to show an adverse use be-
fore there is any presumption in that regard, as the pre-
sumption of adversity will not arise under .a mere use by 
a licensee and knowledge of such use on the part of a 
licensor. 
In Lunt et al. v. Kitchens et al. (1953), 123 Utah 488, 
260 P.2d 535, the facts are almost identical with the 
facts in the instant case. In the Lwnt case defendants 
claim the right of way by use for more than twenty 
years. The evidence shows the two families, W eidners 
and Kitchens, lived in accord and complete harmony. 
There were never any objections to the use of the drive-
way by the Kitchens for delivery of coal and wood to the 
coal shed on the East side of their property, for parking 
their cars and for foot passengers. The W eidners also 
used the driveway although probably to a lesser extent 
since their family was smaller. This Court stated: 
''In other words, the presumption of adversity 
will not arise under mere use by .a licensee and 
knowledge of such use on the part of the licensor. 
Yeager v. Woodruff, 17 Utah 361,53 P.1045. The 
use cannot be adverse when it rests upon license 
or mere neighborly accommodation. Jensen v. 
Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070. Sdrales v. 
Rondos, 116 Utah 288,209 P.2d 562. 
The failure of the W eidners to object to the use 
of their property by the Kitchenses in the case .at 
hand must have been beeause of an implied con-
sent in order to accommodate their neighbors. 
The use by the Kitchenses added no burden to 
the driveway; they did not attempt to widen it, 
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nor to interfere with the use by the Weidners. 
Where a person opens the way for use of his 
own premises and another uses it without inter-
fering with the landowner's use or causing him 
damage, the presumption is that the use was per-
missive and in absence of proof to the contrary, 
the person so using it does not acquire a right 
of way by prescription. Harkness v. Woodman-
see ( 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291) ; Cache Valley Banking 
Company v. Cache County Poultry Growers Asso-
ciation (116 Utah 258, 209 P.2d 251. Since the 
use is presumed to have been with consent in 
1920, unless respondents in the present case have 
presented sufficient evidence to show that it be-
came adverse and that the claim of use against 
permission was known to the W eidne:rs, the de-
cree of the lower court must be reversed." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In the present case, from 1882 until1946, the ground 
on which the driveway is now located was used success-
ively by the father, Samuel R. Skidmore, his son, S. 
Randolph Skidmore, the daughter and sister, Mrs. May 
Pickering, Guy L. Wilton, a tenant of Alexander Picker-
ing, the husband of M.ay Pickering and Minnie G. Picker-
ing, the respondent. 
The evidence further shows that all of these parties 
lived in harmony with each other, were very friendly and 
had no disputes or arguments in connection with the use 
of the driveway. 
Savage v. Nielsen (1948), 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117, 
makes the following statement: 
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"It is apparent from this testimony that the 
use began as permissive use and was used in 
ackowledgment of a superior right and title first 
in the father, Albert Savage, and later in the 
brother, Gordon Savage. In short then, the facts 
have put this case within the rule set out in J en-
sen v. Gerrard, supra, where it was said (85 Utah 
481, 39 P.2d 1073) : 
'A twenty-year use alone of a way is not 
sufficient to establish an easement. Mere 
use of a roadway opened by a landowner for 
his own purposes will be presumed permis-
sive. An antogoaistic or adverse use of a 
way cannot spring from a permissive use. 
A prescriptive title must be acquired ad-
versely. It cannot be adverse when it rests 
upon a license or mere neighborly accommo-
dation. Adverse user is the anti-thesis of 
permissive user. If the use is accompanied 
by any recognition in express terms or by 
implication of a right in the landowner to 
stop such use now or at some time in the 
future, the use is not adverse.' See also: 
Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 
158 p. 684." 
The case of Zollimger v. Framk (19'46), 110 Utah 514, 
175 P. 2d 714, cited by appellant, is distinguishable from 
the case at bar. In the Zollinger case a bridge across 
the irrigation ditch on the road caved in necessitating 
the removal and replacement thereof. The son of the 
landowner removed the broken bridge and immediately 
notified Mr. Zollinger of his action. Zollinger replaced 
the bridge at his own expense, which fact the Court 
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points out clearly showed that Zollinger claimed an ad-
verse right to the owner. 
In the present case there is no evidence that any of 
the Skidmores, including Mrs. Wilde and Mrs. May Pick-
ering or those taking title from them, ever repaired or 
made any improvements on the driveway or paid any 
costs of maintaining the same. 
Buckley v. Cox (1952), 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277, 
states the rule covering the burden of proof as follows: 
"A presumption well established in this state is 
that where a person opens a way for the use of 
his own premises, and another person also uses 
it without causing damage, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, such use by the latter is 
permissive, and not under a claim of right. J en-
sen v. Gerrard, supra; Savage v. Nielsen, 114 
Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117; Cache Valley Banking 
Co. v. Cache County Poultry Growers Ass'n, Utah 
209 P.2d 251; Sdrales v. Rondos, Utah, 209 P.2d 
562." 
We deem it unnecessary to analyze and distinguish 
the cases from other jurisdictions and the texts cited 
by appellant as the cases from our own Court above fully 
cover the points herein involved. 
~The pleadings in the case, pretrial order and the 
evidence do not raise the question of abandonment as 
argued under point II in appellant's brief. All other 
facets of the argument under that point have been an-
swered above. It is decidedly clear that appellant has 
failed to prove an adverse user for a period of twenty 
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years, and that the lower court was justified in granting 
a motion of dismiss·al. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BE'CAUSE AN INDiiSPENSABLE PARTY IS NOT BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
In 1955 Irene P. Schlegel became a joint tenant with 
full rights of survivorship with her mother, Minnie G. 
Pickering. This made her an indispensable party to this 
action. An indispensable party is defined in the case 
of Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Compa'YIIJJ v. Egbert, 
348 U.S. 48, 99 L. ed. 59, 75 S. Ct. 151: 
"In Shields v. Barrow (US) 117 How 130, 139, 
15 L ed 158, 160, indispensable parties were de-
fined as 'Persons who not only have an interest 
in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature 
that a final decree cannot be made without either 
affecting that interest, or leaving the contro-
versy in such a condition that its final termina-
tion may be wholly inconsistent with equity and 
good conscience.'" 
Other authorities on the general subject are: Grama-
tan-Bulliv;an, Inc. v. Koslow (2 Cir. 1957), 240 F.2d 523, 
Clacote v. TeX~as P.ac. Co:al & Oil Co. (5 Cir. 1946), 157 
F.2d 216, and Keegan v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. (5 
Cir.19·46), 155 F.2d 971. 
CONOLIUSION 
The lower court was exceedingly patient in permit-
ting plaintiff every latitude, but of necessity and in ac-
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cordance with well-known procedural requirements called 
a halt to efforts to convert the action into one orf bound-
ary dispute, oral and self-serving statements contradict-
ing written muniments of title and other matters beyond 
the most liberal concept of the pretrial order. Plaintiff 
was given every opportunity to determine title and pos-
sessory rights prior to entering into the real estate 
contract with Mrs. Wilde (R. 84-85). Simple land mea-
surements would have disclosed her South boundary 
as being 261,-4 feet South of the Northwest corner of Lot 
4. An inquiry could have been made of Mrs. Pickering 
concerning the driveway as an incident to plaintiff's 
transaction with Mrs. Wilde. Plaintiff neglected these 
matters. Plaintiff was imt misled by the defendant and 
there are no equities in her favor. 
The evidence is not of the nature and character suf-
ficient to deprive Mrs. Pickering of the full use and 
exclusive benefit of her property. Mrs. Rippentrop can-
not expect something for nothing. One cannot be lightly 
deprived of full enjoyment and ownership of property 
legally in his or her name. Plaintiff's coercive measures 
through the instant action should fail. It must be left to 
the future to determine whether on a neighborly basis 
there can be some permissive use. 
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed 
with costs to respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS 
GUSTIN, RlCHARDS & 
M.A:T1TSSON 
1007 Walker Bank Building 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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